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Abstract—With millimeter wave (mmWave) wireless commu-
nication envisioned to be the key enabler of next generation
high data rate wireless networks, security is of paramount
importance. While conventional security measures in wireless
networks operate at a higher layer of the protocol stack, physical
layer security utilizes unique device dependent hardware features
to identify and authenticate legitimate devices. In this work,
we identify that the manufacturing tolerances in the antenna
arrays used in mmWave devices contribute to a beam pattern
that is unique to each device, and to that end we propose a novel
device fingerprinting scheme based on the unique beam pattern
of different codebooks used by the mmWave devices. Specifically,
we propose a fingerprinting scheme with multiple access points
(APs) to take advantage of the rich spatial-temporal information
of the beam pattern. We perform comprehensive experiments
with commercial off-the-shelf mmWave devices to validate the
reliability performance of our proposed method under various
scenarios. We also compare our beam pattern feature with a
conventional physical layer feature namely power spectral density
feature (PSD). To that end, we implement PSD feature based
fingerprinting for mmWave devices. We show that the proposed
multiple APs scheme is able to achieve over 99% identification ac-
curacy for stationary LOS and NLOS scenarios and significantly
outperform the PSD feature fingerprinting method. For mobility
scenarios, the overall identification accuracy is 96%. In addition,
we perform security analysis of our proposed beam pattern
fingerprinting system and PSD fingerprinting system by studying
the feasibility of performing impersonation attacks. We design
and implement an impersonation attack mechanism for mmWave
wireless networks using state-of-the-art 60 GHz software defined
radios. We discuss our findings and their implications on the
security of the mmWave wireless networks.
Index Terms—Millimeter wave, physical layer security, RF
fingerprinting, 802.11ad, 5G.
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing demands for higher data rates and the availabil-
ity of wide bandwidth at higher frequency spectrum makes
mmWave communication attractive for next generation wire-
less systems. MmWave communication is seen as an enabling
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technology to multi-Gigabit WLANs, wireless display, cable
free connection, virtual reality, to name a few. The current
60 GHz WLAN IEEE standard 802.11ad and the upcoming
standards like IEEE 802.11ay and 5G NR for cellular networks
use mmWave for communication.
With the proliferation of mmWave wireless communication,
enormous amount of data will be transmitted over wireless. It
is estimated that by 2020 there will be 38 billion connected
devices with more than 60% of global mobile traffic through
WiFi [1]. The majority of this traffic will be driven by next
generation mmWave wireless networks such as 802.11 ad/ay.
Hence security is critical for mmWave wireless networks.
Existing security protocols for wireless standards including
mmWave are implemented at the software level and are tra-
ditionally cryptographic based schemes such as WPA, WPA2-
PSK and they are proven to be vulnerable to several attacks
such as DoS attack [2], injection attack [3], spoofing attack
[4] and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. Also, mmWave
communication is inherently considered to be secure due to the
directionality of the antenna beams and attacks such as MITM
is considered to be difficult. Authors in [5] have demonstrated
the potential vulnerability in the beam searching mechanism
currently adopted in the IEEE 802.11ad standard. Through
firmware modifications of the TALON AD7200 router, they
successfully sent a forged sector sweep feedback frame to
the legitimate destination device to divert the beam from that
device to the attacker.
Recently several Intel WLAN cards including the 60 GHz
Intel Tri-Band Wireless AC-18265 card that we use in our
experiments were exposed to frame replay vulnerability [6].
In this attack, an attacker that successfully establishes channel
based MITM can potentially replay frames to the destination.
This vulnerability allowed the replayed frames to pass on to
the operating system as new frames, potentially compromising
the integrity of the already transmitted legitimate frames.
Attacks such as [5] and [6] expose the security vulnerability
of present mmWave wireless networks and could have severe
impact on the security of the system as they can not be
prevented using higher layer security protocols [5], [6]. Hence
there exists a strong need for security measures in addition to
the conventional security methods that are currently used. Such
attacks could be mitigated by verifying the authenticity of the
frames originating from the imposter devices at the physical
layer by using physical layer identification techniques.
Recently physical layer security has become a promising
solution to address the aforementioned security issues and
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2augment the security of wireless systems. Wireless waveforms
transmitted by the device are stamped with unique features that
originate in the physical layer of the transmitter that could
be potentially used to identify and authenticate devices. Such
unique features are generated by the imperfections along the
hardware chain of the transmitter. The features introduced
by the hardware are difficult to forge unlike software based
security schemes and could be used in conjunction with the
existing higher layer security mechanisms if they are reliable
and stable [7].
The RF fingerprints can origin anywhere along the transmit-
ter chain like clock jitter, I/Q offset due to imbalance between I
and Q branch, oscillators, synthesizer for up conversion, DAC
sampling process, non-linearity of the amplifiers, phase noise
of the phase shifters and fabrication process tolerance inherent
to antenna elements. Current RF physical layer features are
either 1) data dependent like transient and preamble based
features that are prone to signal replay attack, or 2) low-
dimensional like modulation based features which can be
easily forged and have limited capacity in terms of number
of devices that can be enrolled, which makes them weak and
limited in practical usage.
Existing works on RF fingerprinting were proposed for
conventional sub-6 GHz wireless band and physical layer
security schemes for mmWave communications remain largely
unexplored. The propagation characteristics of mmWave sig-
nals add a unique dimension to the fingerprinting problem. To
overcome propagation losses at higher frequencies, mmWave
devices uses beamforming enabled by antenna arrays. Now
the natural question arises: Can the antenna arrays in mmWave
devices generate unique fingerprints that could be used to reli-
ably identify and authenticate mmWave devices? The antenna
arrays, owing to the errors and tolerances in manufacturing
processes (Sec II-B), generate distinct beam patterns that are
unique among devices. Typically mmWave devices use a set
of beam patterns and find the best one to use through a process
known as beam searching. The mobility of the user or device
orientation change exposes different angular views of these
beam patterns. We propose to leverage this spatial-temporal
charactersitic of the beam pattern used by the user device. We
show that these device dependent beam patterns can be learned
and reliably employed for device identification. To the best of
our knowledge, no work exists in the literature that utilizes
the spatial beam patterns of the mmWave antenna arrays for
RF fingerprinting. The proposed beam pattern feature has the
following properties: 1) data independent as beam pattern
does not depend on the signal being transmitted, 2) high
dimensional and 3) resilient to impersonation attacks.
A. Contribution
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) We identify that the fabrication process of the antenna
array and the phase shifters used by mmWave devices
introduce unique variations of beam patterns among
the devices. Motivated by this observation, we propose
a novel spatial-temporal beam feature for mmWave
fingerprinting based on the beam patterns swept by the
mmWave device during the beam searching process. To
exploit the rich spatial-temporal feature in the beam
pattern sweep during the beam searching phase, we pro-
pose a multiple APs architecture for RF fingerprinting
mmWave devices and provide an optimal deployment
strategy for the APs. We analyze the potential user
capacity of the proposed beam pattern feature through
COMSOL [8] simulations and find that the beam pattern
feature can support large number of users in the order
of thousands.
2) We demonstrate the reliability and robustness of the pro-
posed spatial-temporal beam feature through extensive
experiments with commercial mmWave devices. In ad-
dition, we compare our proposed feature with an existing
conventional RF feature. To that end, we implement
PSD based device fingerprinting scheme for mmWave
devices. Our proposed fingerprinting system achieves a
very high identification accuracy under stationary LOS
and NLOS scenarios when compared to the conventional
RF feature. We also studied the impact of mobility on
the performance of beam pattern feature. Moreover, our
proposed fingerprinting scheme does not need additional
signal processing or hardware as opposed to the conven-
tional feature which typically requires complex signal
processing and expensive hardware owing to the high
bandwidth of the mmWave signal.
3) We perform security analysis of our proposed mmWave
feature by studying its resilience to impersonation at-
tacks. To that end, we implement impersonation at-
tack on the fingerprinting system using state-of-the art
mmWave software defined radio (SDR) and show that
with multiple APs, impersonation attacks on the beam
pattern feature can be successfully thwarted. On the
other hand, we show that the conventional feature is vul-
nerable to impersonation attacks thus severely limiting
its practical usage.
B. Related Work
Several works exist in the literature that investigate the RF
fingerprints for physical layer identification and classification.
Authors in [9] use the turn-on and turn-off transient part of the
RF signal for fingerprinting. However, acquiring the transient
part of the signal requires expensive high end signal acqui-
sition set up which makes it difficult for many applications
that require low cost fingerprinting techniques. The approach
in [10] uses frequency error, SYNC correlation, I/Q offset,
magnitude error and phase error features extracted from IEEE
802.11 frames and is shown to achieve classification accuracy
of over 99%. Even though such features are comparatively
easier to extract, they are proven to be vulnerable to signal
and feature replay attacks [11]. The authors in [12] study the
physical layer identification of RFID devices using modulation
based features and spectral features. They show that their
proposed RFID features achieves a 0% classification error rate.
Very limited work exists in the literature that studies the
attacks on physical layer fingerprinting methods. The work
in [11] experimentally demonstrates signal replay and feature
3replay attacks on IEEE 802.11 devices. It shows that low
dimensional features such as frame frequency offset or IQ ori-
gin offset can be replayed using high end arbitrary waveform
generators.
All these works on RF fingerprinting are proposed for sub-
6 GHz wireless technologies and to the best of the author
knowledge no work exists in the literature for fingerprinting
commercial mmWave devices. Also the above mentioned
transient and modulation based fingerprints are constrained in
feature space, i.e., they rely on low dimensional feature space
leading to constraints on the number of devices successfully
identified by those features. In this work, distinct from the
above mentioned RF fingerprinting schemes where the spatial
features are typically not considered, we propose a novel high
dimensional RF fingerprinting scheme based on the spatial
signatures of the beam pattern used by the mmWave devices.
C. Organization
We discuss the proposed mmWave fingerprinting system
architecture and feature origin in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we
describe our system implementation and testbed set up. In
Sec. IV, we present comprehensive experimental results for
various practical scenarios and discuss the findings. Section
V discusses impersonation attacks on the proposed mmWave
feature. Section VI discusses conclusions.
II. SYSTEM DESIGN
This section describes the overall system architecture,
source of proposed beam pattern feature, AP deployment
strategy and beam pattern feature extraction protocol.
A. System Architecture and Operational Framework
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Fig. 1. MmWave fingerprinting system architecture.
We consider a mmWave wireless network with multiple APs
and clients deployed in an indoor environment as shown in
Fig. 1. The APs and clients follow the mmWave standard
(e.g., 802.11ad) and perform beam searching to establish
directional communication with each other. The APs utilize
a unique hardware dependent beam pattern feature (Sec. II-B)
to authenticate the clients joining the network. The beam
pattern feature is extracted during the beam searching phase
that already exists in the mmWave standards such as 802.11ad
[13], 802.11ay [14] and 5G NR [15] and does not introduce
any additional protocol and signal processing overhead. The
APs are placed in an optimal position in the deployment area
using the method described in Sec. II-C. All the APs are
connected to a back-end server through a backhaul network or
Gigabit Ethernet. The back-end server runs the classification
and identification algorithm to authenticate the clients. The
system operates in a two-stage process: 1) learning stage and
2) identification stage. During the learning stage, devices are
enrolled and beam pattern feature databases for the enrolled
devices are built. Each device is given an identity label
Li, i = 1, 2, · · · , N with N being the number of clients. The APs
initiate the beam searching mechanism (sector level sweep in
802.11ad) periodically and also triggered by device mobility,
extract the beam pattern feature vector and communicate the
feature vector and device identity label Li to the backend
server. The learning stage is a one-time process and is com-
pleted before the client devices are authenticated and admitted
to the system. The backend server builds the beam pattern
feature database for each enrolled client Li and performs
learning/training using the learning method discussed in Sec.
II-F. During the identification stage, the device that intends
to join the network, performs beam searching with the APs.
Each AP extracts the beam pattern feature vector of the device
to be identified and the backend server verifies it against the
feature of the claimed identity of the device.
B. Phased Array Beam Pattern Feature: A Closer Look
In this section we take a closer look at the antenna arrays
found in commercial mmWave devices to identify the source
of fingerprint due to beam pattern variations. Without loss
of generality, assume a 2D planar antenna array which is
popularly used for mmWave applications. The beam pattern
of the antenna array is given by
f (θ, φ) = | fel(θ, φ)
Mx−1∑
m=0
My−1∑
n=0
wm,n,ke j2pi(mdxacosφ+ndyasinφ) |2,
(1)
where a = sinθλ and fel(θ, φ) is the radiation field of individual
antenna element. λ is the wavelength, Mx and My are the num-
ber of antenna elements along x-axis and y-axis respectively.
wm,n,k = αm,ne jδm,n is the complex excitation of the m, nth
element to form the kth beam pattern with αmn and δmn being
the amplitude and phase excitations of m, nth element. From
(1), the beam pattern of the antenna array is a function of the
radiation field of individual elements, amplitude and phase
applied to each of the elements and the array geometry. In
addition to these, the beam pattern of the array is also affected
by the manufacturing tolerances and manufacturing errors that
arise due to masking, etching and dielectric constant tolerances
during antenna array fabrication.
The first source of error in antenna array fabrication is
due to the dielectric properties of the substrate used in the
antenna. The antenna patch resonance frequency depends on
the relative permittivity of the material used for substrate and
is given by fc ∼ c
2∗L∗
√
(r )
where c is speed of light in
vacuum, L is the patch length and r is the relative permittivity.
Some of the popular substrates used for mmWave antenna are
Rogers R©RO3003, RO3203 [16], duroid 5880 [17], and LTCC
Ferro A6-S [18]. The relative permittivity r of these subtrates
4has a tolerance value that deviates from the specified r . E.g.,
Ferro A6-S substrate has a r of 5.9 ± 0.2 [18].
A second source of variations in the beam patterns is the
dimensional tolerance of the antenna fabrication process. The
manufacturing error increases considerably at higher frequen-
cies due to reduced antenna size and also due to increasing
substrate dielectric r (antenna patch width decreases with
increase in r ). Due to the shrinkage in dimension during the
fabrication process and the errors that depend on the tolerance
of the process used to fabricate, the final dimensions of the
antenna are not the same across different batches. The Ferro
A6-S substrate typically used for mmWave antenna fabrication
has a x-y shrinkage as high as 15% ± 2 [18].
As shown in (1), phase shifts are applied to each element
of the antenna array to steer the beam toward intended direc-
tion. The phase shifters used for beamforming in commercial
mmWave devices are typically low cost, low resolution with
high phase errors. The ith phase shifter has a phase deviation
error of ±∆δi from the actual phase value and the error is
independent among the phase shifters used in different antenna
elements. If θi is the ideal phase shift, the actual phase shift
applied to the ith element is θi ± ∆δi . For 15 to 26 GHz
frequency range, the phase shifter in [19] introduces an rms
phase error of 6.5◦ − 13◦ and for 57-64GHz range, the 5-bit
phase shifter in [20] has a rms phase error of < 10◦. The 3-bit
phase shifter in [21] for 60 GHz has a maximum phase error
of 10.4◦ and rms error of 5.7◦.
All these errors due to tolerances associated with antenna
fabrication process as well as the phase shifters, introduce
unique hardware dependent beam pattern variation among
antenna arrays even with the same architecture and geometry.
Fig. 2. 6 × 6 30 GHz antenna
array designed using COMSOL.
Fig. 3. Single element of 6 × 6
antenna array.
Antenna Array Design and Simulation: To further un-
derstand the effect of the antenna manufacturing tolerances and
phase shifter errors on the beam pattern variations of mmWave
antenna array, we design a 6 × 6 slot-coupled microstrip
patch antenna array using COMSOL as shown in Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3. The resonant frequency of the array is 30 GHz. The
dimensions of the individual antenna elements are as follows:
The substrate dimensions are 4mm × 4mm. The patch length
and width are 1.7mm and 1.63mm, respectively. The slot width
and length are 0.1mm and 0.605mm, respectively. The feedline
is of width 0.11mm and the length of the extended feedline
is 0.52mm. The thickness of the patch and feed substrate is
0.1mm. The dielectric constant of the substrate is 5.9. The
spacing between the antenna element is 4mm along the X
and Y directions. The phase applied to the individual antenna
elements is 0◦. As discussed previously, the variations of the
antenna beam pattern feature come from the manufacturing
process of the antenna array. Hence, in our simulation, we vary
the above mentioned antenna array properties within tolerance
limits [22], [23], [18] to understand the effect of antenna
fabrication process variations on the beam pattern. We consider
a Ferro A6-S substrate with r = 5.9±0.2. The X, Y shrinkage
of the LTCC process is assummed to be 15% and the phase
shifter error is 5◦. Fig. 4 shows the beam pattern variations
due to the substrate dielectric tolerance, dimension shrinkage,
antenna element spacing variation and phase shifter errors. We
can see that the tolerances associated with the materials and
fabrication process introduce variations in the beam pattern of
the antenna array.
Feature uniqueness: For practical usage of device fin-
gerprinting, the proposed beam pattern feature must be unique
among devices and scalable. From our simulated beam pattern
in Fig. 4, we see that errors due to tolerances of the antenna
manufacturing process and phase shifters result in variation
of the beam pattern among different antenna arrays. The
variations are found to be as high as 3.2dB. Through our ex-
periments in Sec. IV, we show through classification accuracy
that these unique beam pattern variations among devices of
same manufacturer and across manufacturers can be learned
with high accuracy. Furthermore, we also provide analysis on
the maximum number of users that can be supported by our
proposed beam pattern feature.
Feature stability: Another important characteristic of the
suitability of a fingerprint for device identification is stability
[24]. The obtained fingerprint should be invariant over time.
To verify the stability of our proposed beam pattern feature,
we set up a Talon AD7200 router as client and recorded 200
beam searching beacons everyday from it over a period of 1
week. Fig. 6 shows that the extracted beam pattern feature is
stable over a long period of time.
User Capacity: Previously, we discussed uniqueness of
the beam pattern feature among different antenna arrays with
identical geometries and materials used. However a natural
question arises: how many such devices (antenna arrays)
can have unique beam patterns? If the number of devices
enrolled in the system exceeds the capacity of the system, then
the beam pattern features of devices will overlap decreasing
the accuracy of the identification system. Therefore, it is
important to study the user capacity of the proposed beam
pattern feature based on the characteristics of the antenna array
and the limitations of the fingerprinting device. As discussed
previously, the beam pattern of the antenna array significantly
deviates from the theoretical beam pattern due to the errors
introduced by the tolerances associated with materials used
and the fabrication process. With the antenna array in Sec.
II-B, we vary the substrate dielectric (5.9 ± 0.2), dimensions
of the patch (X,Y shrinkage 15% ± 2), and phase (θi ± 5◦)
of the phase shifter within their respective tolerance values
and perform parametric sweep simulation using COMSOL.
The resulting beam patterns for various combinations of the
parameters is shown in Fig. 5. Here we are interested in finding
the variance of the beam pattern fθ due to the errors. Also it
should be noted, since beam pattern is a function of θ, the
maximum deviation of the beam pattern is also a function
of θ. As discussed in Sec. II-D, we learn multiple angular
directions θ of the beam pattern fθ of the user. We find that,
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Fig. 4. Beam pattern variation due to the tolerance of (a) substrate dielectric, (b) antenna dimension, (c) inter element spacing and (d) phase shifters.
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Fig. 6. Stability of fingerprints.
for the antenna array in Sec. II-B, the maximum variation of
the beam pattern fθ for all θ to be 3.2dB.
Recall that, the beampattern of the device fθ is obtained
at the receiver by measuring the signal power at θ. Hence
the resolution of the digitizer used at the receiver plays an
important role in further determining the user capacity of the
system. The analog-to-digital converter (ADC) has a maximum
voltage Vmax and minimum voltage Vmin it can sample without
distortion with full scale VFS = Vmax − Vmin. The number of
discrete voltage levels the ADC can output depends on the
number of bits n it uses to represent a voltage level. For a n
bits ADC, the voltage resolution ∆v is given by VFS2n−1 . Taking
into account the voltage resolution of a 13-bit ADC, for a
beam pattern the maximum number of users the fingerprinting
system can support is 3200. Since our fingerprinting system
uses all the codebooks transmitted during beam searching
phase, the user capacity scales with the number of beam
patterns used. For a mmWave device with N codebooks, the
maximum user capacity is 3200 × N .
C. AP Deployment
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Fig. 7. (a) Floor plan of the experimental area and (b) distribution of
average signal strength variations at 3 APs for random deployment strategy
and optimal deployment strategy (2) under stationary and device mobility.
As discussed in the previous sections, the mmWave beam
searching mechanism allows the APs to obtain high dimen-
sional beam pattern features from the devices. However, from
a particular spatial position, each AP can only obtain a
single angular view of each beam pattern used by the client.
Deploying multiple APs in the area will allow the APs to
have multiple views of the beam pattern of the client. But if
the APs are deployed too close to each other or deployed in
a position with obstacles, the beam pattern feature obtained
by them might not offer distinct information. Therefore the
deployment position of APs in our proposed mmWave device
identification system plays an important role. The APs have
to be deployed such that the device to be identified is in the
signal coverage area. In this section, we discuss a practical
deployment strategy for the APs.
Optimal Deployment: We propose a method to optimally
deploy APs which can be applied to any environment and
does not require extensive measurement campaigns. The APs
are to be deployed in an area U. For a certain user position
Pu , the probability the user is in the coverage area of the AP,
i.e., the beacons from the user reach the AP can be expressed
as, Pcov =
∑
i P(Puis inAi).P(SNR(Pu) > T |Puis inAi),
where Ai is the coverage area of AP i and T is the threshold
for the signal to be received. SNR(Pu) is the SNR at
Pu . The user location Pu is assumed to follow a certain
probability distribution with density f (Pu). We assume
the user’s movement follows a mobility model as in [25].
For the user mobility, the probability the user visits a new
position is given by Pnew(n) = αS−γ(n) and the probability
of visiting an old position is given by Pold(n) = 1 − Pnew(n)
where 0 < α < 1 and γ > 0. S(n) is the number of visited
positions in n number of jumps. The probability the user
departs the area covered by an AP is given by, Pd =
1−
{
1
v¯
[
( AU )2E[di, i ]+(1− AU ) AU E[do, i ]
]
+ AU E[∆ti ]
}
{
1
v¯
[
( AU )2E[di, i ]+2(1− AU ) AU E[do, i ]
]
+(1− AU )2]+ AU E[∆ti+(1− AU )E[∆to ]
}
where ∆ti is the user’s waiting time inside the area covered
by the AP and its distribution is given by f (∆ti) = |∆ti |−1−βi
with 0 < βi ≤ 1. di,i is the users jump distance within the
coverage area and do,o is the distance between two points
outside the coverage area. do,i is the distance between one
point outside and one point inside the coverage area. v¯ is the
average velocity of user mobility. Therefore the probability
the user and the AP are able to successfully receive each
other’s signal is given by Pcov,mobility = (1 − Pd)Pcov .
For multiple APs, the connection probability for the
ith AP is given by Pcov =
∫
Ai
F(SNR(di)) f (Pu)ds
6where Ai is the area covered by the ith AP, di is
the distance between the user and the ith AP given by
di = | |PAP,i − Pu | |. The connection probability can be further
written as Pcov =
∑
i
∫
Ai−∪ j,i A j F (SNR(di))) f (Pu)ds +∑No
n=1
∫
Ao
1 −∏i [1 − F (SNR(di)) ] f (Pu)ds, where Ao is
the area of the overlapped coverage region due to multiple
APs and No is the number of overlapped regions. F(x) is an
indicator function with F(x) = 1 for x ≥ T and F(x) = 0 for
x < T .
Therefore for the user and AP to successfully receive each
other’s beacon signals, the APs can be deployed so as to
maximize the signal coverage probability. I.e.,
maxPAP, iPcov,mobility (2)
The optimal positions of the APs for the deployment area
shown in Fig.7a is found by solving (2). To reduce the
complexity in searching for the optimal AP positions PAP,i , we
can solve (2) for predefined user supplied AP positions known
through environment familiarity or divide the deployment area
into grids and provide the center of the grid locations as user
supplied AP positions. We used the grid approach to find the
AP positions that maximizes (2).
Experiment Validation: We compare the AP deployment
solution from (2) with a random deployment strategy. For the
optimal strategy, the APs are placed at locations returned by
(2) and for random deployment, the APs are positioned at 3
random locations in the room. The SNR of the client to each
of the AP is measured at the AP and averaged across all the
APs. Fig. 7b plots the CCDF of signal coverage for differ-
ent client mobility scenarios: a) stationary, and b) mobility
under random deployment strategy and optimal deployment
strategy. We set the minimum SNR required to receive the
beam searching beacon to 12 dB (corresponding to -78dBm
control signal threshold as specified in 802.11ad standard
and -90dBm noise floor). We see that, both the random and
the optimal strategies exceed the SNR requirement, however
the optimal strategy exceeds 25dB SNR whereas random
deployment could only achieve 15dB SNR 90% of the time.
For the mobility experiment, we see that the optimal strategy
exceeds the SNR requirement for 95% of the time whereas the
random deployment exceeds the SNR requirement only 75%
of the time. The signal quality gained through environment
aware optimal AP deployment strategy directly translates to
improved identification accuracy for the devices.
D. Feature Extraction Protocol
Now, having discussed the source of our proposed beam
pattern feature, its uniqueness and potential applicability to
mmWave device fingerprinting, how do we measure the beam
pattern in practical scenarios? MmWave devices transmit
beacons through each of their sectors with unique beam
patterns. For e.g., the Talon AD7200 router transmits 32
different beam patterns in each of its 32 sectors during beam
searching, a process known as sector level sweep (SLS) in
802.11ad standard. We can utilize the SLS or beam searching
process to measure the beam pattern f kθ of the kth beam
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Fig. 9. Beam pattern view at
3 APs.
pattern. During the beam searching process, the user device
either initiates beam searching with the APs or responds to
beam searching beacons from the APs, during which the user
transmits a beam pattern k ∈ K in one of its sectors. AP 1
measures f kθ1, i (APs measure the received signal strength of
beam patterns, a process inherent to 802.11ad/ay and 5G-NR
standards), assuming θ1,i is the orientation angle of AP 1 with
respect to the user in global coordinate system. Now, as the
user transmits every beam pattern k ∈ K , AP 1 measures
f kθ1,i for each beam pattern k and builds the feature vector
Fθ1,i = [ f 1θ1,i, f 2θ1,i, · · · , f Kθ1,i]. Each element f kθ1, i in the vector
Fθ1, i is contributed by a distinct angle θ1,i in one of the k ∈ K
beam patterns used by the user device during beam searching.
When multiple APs are available as shown in Fig. 8, each
AP m will have distinct view θm,i of the kth beam pattern,
where m = 1, · · · ,M with M being the number of APs, to
form the vector Fθm, i = [ f 1θm, i , f 2θm, i , · · · , f Kθm, i ],m = 1, ...,M .
Recall that, each AP only has a distinct view θ of a particular
beam pattern k. We illustrate this scenario where the devices
are stationary with respect to the APs.
Stationary devices: For a stationary scenario with fixed
device orientation angle relative to the APs, the beam pattern
vector Fθm, i of the codebooks swept by the device during the
beam searching mechanism does not change with respect to
the device-AP direction. Fig. 9a show such a scenario where
the orientation in terms of best sector ID from the user to
AP direction remains same for 500 beam searching periods
spanning 120secs. AP 1, AP 2 and AP 3 always see best
sector 2, 7, and 16 respectively from the user device. The
APs could simply extract the beam pattern vector Fθm, i of the
K codebooks over several beam searching periods and build
the fingerprint database for that device. However, if the device
moves or the orientation of the device changes with respect to
the APs, then the beam pattern fingerprint database needs to
be updated as the beam pattern feature vector Fθm, i changes
with change in orientation of the device with respect to the
AP. To authenticate a mobile user, the beam pattern f kθ of the
kth codebook for all feasible θ must be measured.
Now how do we learn all possible views of a particular
7codebook k? Next, we discuss mobility scenario under which
multiple views of a codebook k could be learned.
Beam pattern feature due to mobility: MmWave devices
initiate the beam searching process whenever the best beam
found during the previous beam searching phase becomes
outdated due to device mobility or orientation change. When
the device moves or orientation changes, the angle θi of the kth
codebook of the user device seen by the AP changes as shown
in Fig. 8. A simple rotation of the device by d degrees from
initial orientation θ will result in beam pattern f(θ+d) at the AP.
Can we use device mobility to learn the beam pattern of the
codebooks used by the devices? To answer this, we performed
experiments with APs deployed in the optimal position (Sec.
II-C) in the environment and orientation angle in terms of
best sector ID of the user with respect to each of the AP is
measured for 100s of random user mobility. We see from Fig.
9b, the best sector ID of the user changes with respect to each
of the three APs. The APs learn distinct beam pattern points
f kθm, i for each of the k codebooks everytime the user moves
or device orientation changes.
E. Mobility vs. Multiple APs
We discussed in Sec. II-C and Sec. II-D how employing
multiple APs and the user device mobility helps in learning the
rich spatial features of the beam patterns used by the devices.
Here we discuss the trade-off among multiple APs, mobility
and security implications.
• In a single AP system, the AP can only use one distinct
view of the user beam pattern to authenticate it which
makes the system vulnerable to impersonation attack as
shown in Sec. V-A. Employing multiple APs would allow
the APs to utilize multiple views of the user beam pattern
to authenticate it which drastically improves the security
of the system against impersonation attacks. However,
multiple APs increases the infrastructure cost of the
system.
• One way to reduce the cost and increase the security is to
take advantage of device mobility. If the user is mobile,
a single AP is sufficient and the AP could wait until it
learns more distinct views in a beam pattern used by the
user and proceed to authenticate the clients. In this way,
it will be hard for the attacker to know the number of
views used by the AP for authentication and spoof it.
F. Classification Architecture
Given a set of beam pattern features and associated target
device IDs for each of those features, the objective of the
classifcation problem is to learn a function or model that
uniquely maps the beam pattern feature to its originating
device. We model the mmWave device identification task
as a multi-class classification problem. The input to the
classifier is the beam patterns extracted during the beam
searching process. The outputs are corresponding class labels.
We propose to use a 4 layer convolutional neural network
(CNN) architecture for our classification system. The network
consists of two 1D convolutional layers and two dense layer
with ReLu activation function and a fully connected softmax
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Fig. 10. 60 GHz wireless network RF fingerprinting: Scenario showing
multiple-APs (Alice’s) and Bob’s in the wireless network. Attacker Mallory
launches impersonation attack on legitimate user Bob 1 using state-of-the-art
60 GHz SDR.
layer. The convolutional layers use a filter size of 256 and 80
respectively and are initialized with Glorot uniform initializer.
The dense layers were initialized with He normal initializer.
Categorical cross entropy loss function and Adam solver is
used for training. The input feature dimension to the network
is N × M × K where N is the number of training samples, M
is the number of APs and K is the feature length. To reduce
the effect of amplitude variations due to user-AP distance, the
input beam pattern feature vector is z-score normalized with
Fˆθm, i =
Fθm, i−mean(Fθm, i )
std(Fθm, i ) . To train the network, the fingerprint
database is randomly split into training set and validation set.
The training is validated using the validation set for each
epoch of training. An early stopping criterion is utilized to
stop the training when the validation loss does not minimize
after 5 number of evaluations of the validation set. The CNN
is implemented in Python using Keras [26] and trained on an
Intel Core i7-5500U machine.
III. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION AND TEST-BED
DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we describe our system implementation and
a testbed we set up for mmWave RF fingerprinting. Fig. 10
shows a real-world application scenario where a mmWave
wireless network is deployed with multiple APs and multiple
users connected to the wireless network. For the rest of the
discussion we refer to the APs as Alice 1, Alice 2, and so
on and users as Bob 1, Bob 2, and so on. Without loss of
generality, we assume that Bob 1 is connected to Alice 1
after successful completion of authentication procedure using
the proposed RF fingerprinting. Mallory M is a malicious
node that wants to gain unauthorised access to the network by
forging the identity of legitimate node Bob 1. For the scenario
described, first we discuss the reliability of the proposed
beam pattern fingerprint in enabling Alices to authenticate
legitmate Bobs under various scenarios. Next, we analyse the
security impact of the system by evaluating the ability of
Mallory to impersonate the identity of legitimate node Bob
1 by performing signal replay attack.
Before proceeding to discuss the reliability and security
analysis, we detail the mmWave devices, experiment setting
and signal acquistion method in detail.
8A. mmWave devices
Here we present the mmWave devices used for reliability
and security analysis experiments.
a) Alice and Bob: We have evaluated the reliability
and security of our proposed fingerprinting method discussed
in Sec. II on commercially available mmWave devices. We
conduct experiments on the following devices: 3 TP-Link
Talon AD7200 routers, 3 Netgear Nighthawk X10 Smart WiFi
routers, 1 Acer Travelmate P446M laptop with Qualcomm 60
GHz NIC and 6 Intel Tri-band 18625 NICs equipped with
antenna model antenna-M 10101-R. The devices are labeled as
follows: Talon1, Talon2, Talon3, Netgear1, Netgear2, Acer1,
Intel1, Intel2, Intel3, Intel4, Intel5, Intel6. All these devices
follow the 802.11ad standard and perform beam searching
procedure as outlined in [13]. We use 802.11ad based devices
since at present they are the only mmWave devices that are
available in the market. Nevertheless, the proposed method
and the findings in our experiments are applicable to other
mmWave wireless standards such as IEEE 802.11ay and 5G-
NR as they also utilize antenna array and beam searching
mechanism to establish directional communication.
b) Attacker Mallory: The attacker M uses one X60
node [27], to record the transmissions from legitimate device
and retransmit them. X60 nodes are based on the 60 GHz
software defined radio. The X60 node has a Si-Beam 60 GHz
antenna array. The antenna array has 12 transmit elements
and 12 receive elements with reconfigurable codebooks. The
codebooks can be configured through setting the phase of
each element of the antenna array. In our experiments, we use
codebook 12 with beam pattern shown in Fig. 17a. Before
performing the attack, the RF chain in the transmitter is
calibrated. The RF chain introduces I/Q imbalance and DC
offset to the transmitted signal. Also the synthesizer in the
transmitter introduces LO leakage which can degrade the
quality of the replayed signal. To process the signal from
the ADC as well as to transmit baseband signals through the
X60 testbed, a FPGA module is designed using Labview. The
FPGA module interfaces with the ADC of the X60 node while
in the receiver mode and interfaces to the DAC of the X60
node while in the transmitter mode.
B. Signal Acquisition
Since the signal strength measurements made during the
beam searching process is not available outside of the firmware
for most of the devices other than TP-Link Talon AD7200
[28], therefore to maintain uniformity, we receive the beam
patterns swept during beam searching phase using VubiQ
60GHz mmWave receiver. We noticed that the mmWave
devices we used in our experiments use channel 2 (60.48 GHz)
of the 60 GHz band to perform beam searching. The VubiQ
receiver is tuned to 60.48 GHz and it downconverts the re-
ceived signal to analog baseband. The analog baseband signal
is sampled using an Agilent oscilloscope. The oscilloscope is
controlled by a Matlab script to acquire the signal and save
them in the hard drive.
IV. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL
EVALUATION
We implement the proposed beam pattern fingerprinting
system and evaluate its effectiveness in various settings. We
compare our beam pattern fingerprint with another conven-
tional fingerprint method namely PSD fingerprint. To that end,
we implement PSD feature based fingerprinting for mmWave
devices. Before proceeding to evaluate our beam pattern
feature, we first present the PSD feature extraction method.
1) Spectral Feature: We use PSD of the received signal as a
feature for device classification and identification. The PSD is
a frequency domain feature and is estimated at the baseband
of the received signal. Let y(n) be the received signal. The
normalized spectral fingerprint S(n) is given by
S(n) = |Y (n)|
2∑
n |Y (n)|2
. (3)
Y (n) is the N length Discrete Fourier Transform of the received
signal y(n). The length of the resulting feature vector depends
on the DFT length N . The effect of DFT length N on the
classification performance is discussed in Sec. IV-B.
0 1 2 3
Sample Index #104
0
5
10
15
M
ag
ni
tu
de
Gb128 Cross-correlation peaks
(a)
-2 0 2
frequency (Hz) 10 9
-50
-40
-30
-20
M
ag
ni
tu
de
 (d
B)
Acer
Talon1
Talon2
Netgear1
(b)
Fig. 11. (a) Correlation of the received beacons with Gb128 sequence and
(b) PSD feature of devices.
Feature Extraction and Classification Method: The PSD
is obtained from the preamble part of the received signal. We
use beacons transmitted by the mmWave devices during the
beam searching process to extract the PSD feature. The pro-
posed method is applicable to all mmWave wireless standards
and in this section, we focus on 802.11ad standard since we
use 802.11ad devices for our experiments. 802.11ad devices
transmit the control PHY preamble [13] during the beam
searching process. The preamble part of the beacon transmitted
during beam searching consists of short training (STF) field
and channel estimation (CE) field. The STF consists of 48
repetitions of length 128 Golay sequence Gb128 followed by a
single −Gb128 Golay sequence and a −Ga128 Golay sequence.
We use the STF and CE part of the preamble for PSD feature
extraction. The beginning of the beacon frame is detected by
the normalized auto-correlation of the known STF sequence
with the received beacon frame [29]. Fig. 11a shows the
preamble correlation to detect the beginning of the beacon
frame. Once the frame is detected, the STF and CE part of the
frame are used for PSD estimation using (3). The estimated
PSD feature for three of the devices is shown in Fig. 11b.
The feature vector length is 1 × NFFT where NFFT is the
9number of FFT points used to compute PSD. The classification
method described in section II-F is used for PSD feature
classification and identification with the input dimension of
the convolutional neural network set to 1 × NFFT .
Next we proceed to discuss the reliability of our proposed
beam pattern fingerprint and compare with the PSD fingerprint
in terms of classification and identification accuracy.
A. Experimental setting and metrics
For the reliability analysis experiments, we broadly clas-
sify our experimental setting into the following scenarios: 1)
stationary LOS, 2) stationary non line-of-sight (NLOS), 3)
limited mobility and 4) high mobility. All the experiments
are performed in the indoor laboratory area with floor plan
shown in Fig. 7a. For all the experiments, the locations of the
APs are obtained from Sec. II-C and fixed. They are denoted as
AP1, AP2 and AP3 in Fig. 7a. To evaluate our proposed beam
pattern feature, we present the following metrics: 1) average
accuracy metric which is the ratio of correctly predicted
observations to the total predicted observations, 2) Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve which is obtained by
plotting the true positive rate (TPR) against the false positive
rate (FPR) for various thresholds and 3) Equal Error Rate
(EER), an operating point in ROC at which false accept rate
(FAR) = false reject rate (FRR). Lower the EER value, better
is the system performance.
B. Classification Results
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of the feature learned by CNN.
Training size and classification accuracy: In this section
we experimentally evaluate the number of training feature
vectors needed to train the classifier in Sec. II-F to achieve
a certain overall accuracy and in doing so we seek to answer
the following question: How well is the classifier in Sec. II-F
able to distinguish between devices of same manufacturer and
across manufacturers? We vary the training size for each
evaluation while keeping the testing size fixed at 6000 feature
vectors (500 per class) and calculate the overall classification
accuracy metric. Fig. 12 shows the classification accuracy ver-
sus training samples required per class. For the beam pattern
feature, we see that with 3 APs less than 50 training samples
per class are required to achieve an accuracy of over 99%.
For the PSD feature, the number of training samples required
depends on the FFT size. For 128 FFT size, the overall
accuracy saturates at 98.5% at 350 training samples. For 256,
1024 and 4096 FFT size, the overall accuracy saturated at 99%
for 350 training samples. For training samples per class above
350, the classification accuracy did not improve for increasing
training sample size. For lower training samples, increasing
the FFT size significantly improves the classification accuracy.
The PSD feature requires significantly more training samples
per class when compared to our proposed beam pattern feature.
Fig. 13 shows the 2-dimensional embedding of the output
weights learned by the CNN classifier for the beam pattern
feature 3 APs case. The 12 devices form 12 distinct clusters
indicating the beam pattern feature is unique among devices
and the classifier was able to learn the representations of the
features to form distinct clusters.
C. Identification Results
During the identification phase, the claimed identity (e.g.,
MAC address) of the device is authenticated by performing
feature extraction and comparing it with the feature of the
claimed device stored in the fingerprint database. In this
section, we compare the identification performance of our pro-
posed beam pattern feature with the PSD feature for stationary
and NLOS scenarios. In addition, for the beam pattern feature
we assess the impact of mobility (device orientation change)
on the identification and highlight the challenges.
1) Stationary: This experiment pertains to scenarios in-
volving communication between laptops and APs in office,
conference and living room scenarios, where the devices are
kept stationary with respect to their position and orientation
[30]. All the devices are tested with the same position and
orientation in the location depicted as star symbol in Fig.
7a. At each AP, a 1000 feature vector per device is obtained
and split into training, validation and test sets of 35%, 15%
and 50% respectively. Fig. 14a shows the ROC curves for 1
AP and 3 APs scenario for the beam pattern feature. We see
that the area under the ROC curve (ROC-AUC) is 0.998 and
0.999 for 1 AP and 3 APs case respectively. The EERs for
all the devices are < 1% for both 1 AP and 3 APs case.
For the beam pattern feature, we see that, as long as the
device is fingerprinted and identified in the same orientation,
the overall accuracy is 99.6% and 99.9% for 1 AP and 3 APs
case respectiveley. Fig. 14b shows the ROC curve for 4096
FFT PSD feature based identification. The ROC-AUC for 128,
256, 1024, and 4096 FFT PSD are all over 0.99. The EERs are
< 1% for all the devices and all FFT size PSD features. The
average identification accuracies for PSD feature with 128,
256, 1024 and 4096 FFT are 97%, 98.4%, 99%, and 99.1%
respectively. A closer look at the identification performance
reveals that for 128 FFT and 256 FFT, some of the Intel
based devices identification accuracy is as low as 89% and
95% respectively. Hence for PSD feature fingerprinting, higher
FFT size on the order of 1024 and higher is needed to achieve
an identification accuracy of over 99%, which significantly
increases the complexity of the fingerprinting system when
compared to beam pattern feature based system.
2) Effect of Channel: In practical scenarios, the line-of-
sight of the device to be identified might be blocked by
obstacles in the environment and only NLOS might be avail-
able. Experiments are performed to assess the identification
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Fig. 14. ROC curves: (a) beam pattern stationary, (b) PSD stationary, (c) beam pattern NLOS and (d) PSD NLOS.
performance under such NLOS scenarios. The user devices are
positioned at a location identified as NLOS behind a cubicle
partition as shown in Fig. 7a. Among the 3 APs, only AP2
is in LOS with respect to the user devices. The orientation
and position of all the devices are kept the same. 1000 feature
vector per device at each AP is obtained. The database is
split into training, validation and test set with 35%, 15%, and
50% respectively. Fig.14c shows the ROC curve for the beam
pattern feature in NLOS scenario. Due to space constraints, we
show the ROC curves only for the NLOS AP namely AP3 and
3 APs case. Only 6 devices have EER < 5% for the NLOS AP
3. For the 3 APs case, the EERs of all the devices are < 1%.
For the single AP case, we see that the performance depends
on the location of the AP. The average identification accuracy
across all the devices are 95.7%, 99.2% and 94.2% at AP1,
AP2 and AP3 respectively. The average identification accuracy
for 3APs case is 99.5%. Employing multiple APs significantly
increases the identification accuracy in the NLOS case. For the
PSD feature, we report the metric for only 4096 FFT PSD due
to space constraints. The ROC curves for PSD feature under
NLOS scenario at NLOS AP3 and LOS AP2 is presented in
Fig. 14d. The EERs are all < 1% for the LOS AP2 and < 5%
for the NLOS AP3. The average identification accuracies are
94%, 99% and 94% at AP1, AP2 and AP3 respectively. We
see that, the beam pattern feature is robust to NLOS and the
identification accuracy is significantly higher than the PSD
feature in the NLOS scenario.
3) Effect of Mobility: In this section, we seek to answer
the following question: How much does the mobility of the
device affect the performance of the beam pattern based finger-
printing system? We categorize the experiments into limited
mobility and high mobility according to the user mobility
behavior. For each category, we conduct comprehensive exper-
iments to understand their impact on the identification system.
The mobility model is adopted from IEEE 802.11ay channel
model [31]. The mobility of the device can be represented
by velocity vector v = vx Ûi + vy Ûj + vz Ûk which is the sum
of the scalar components along x, y, z directions. For our
mobility experiments, the vertical component of the velocity
vz is 0 meaning the devices are kept at the same height. Due
to mobility, the user device performs beamforming training
to find or update its best direction (sector) to communicate.
The beam pattern feature vector is extracted from the beam
searching beacons received along the mobility path. For each
device, 500 beam pattern feature vector per device is obtained
along the mobility path. 10 devices (Talon1 to 3, Acer1,
Netgear1 to 2, and Intel1 to 4) are evaluated in total.
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Fig. 15. ROC curves: (a) limited mobility and (b) high mobility.
Limited Mobility: We specifically look at the scenario
where the user is walking straight with limited device ori-
entation change. Assuming the user is moving along the x
direction, the movement along the y direction (velocity vector
vy) is kept minimum to imitate a user walking straight with
holding the device steady. The devices are kept in a cart and
moved with walking speed (1-2m/s) along the path shown in
the Fig. 7a. Throughout the experiment, the device orientation
is kept constant. Fig. 15a shows the ROC curves. The EERs of
all the devices are < 10% and < 1% for 1 AP and 3 APs case
respectively. The average accuracies for 1 AP (at AP1) and
3 APs case are 95% and 99.7% respectively. This shows that
obtaining multiple views of the beam pattern through multiple
APs significantly increases the identification accuracy.
High Mobility: Here we look at the mobility scenario
where the direction of mobility and orientation are random.
The device is moved to imitate walking speed of human. This
experiment captures a real-world practical scenario and tests
the limitations of our fingerprint database building method as
random device orientation change introduced by mobility may
result in the beam pattern feature vector not being represented
in the feature training database. Fig. 15b shows the ROC curve
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for this scenario for 1 AP and 3 APs fingerprinting system.
For a 1 AP system, only six (Talon1, Talon3, Acer1, Netgear1,
Netgeat2, Intel3) of the 10 devices achieve an EER≤ 5%.
On the other hand, for 3 APs system, all but Intel4 achieve
an EER≤ 5%. The overall identification accuracy for 1 AP
and 3 AP system is 92% and 96% respectively showing
significant advantage of utilizing multiple APs system for
mmWave device fingerprinting.
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Fig. 16. Confusion matrix for beam pattern feature for orientation change.
Impact of Mobility on Identification: The identification
accuracy of the beam pattern feature based identification
system depends on the orientation of the device to be iden-
tified. If the device orientation changes, different from the
training fingerprint, the accuracy drastically decreases. We
looked at the impact of device mobility (orientation change)
on a beam pattern feature fingerprinting system by keeping
only the fingerprints extracted from one fixed direction in the
database and excluding all others. The devices are identified
from a direction other than the one in the trained database.
Fig. 16 shows the confusion matrix for such a scenario. The
fingerprinting system could not discriminate the devices and
the average accuracy is 25%. Hence, it is essential to learn
as many orientations in the beam pattern as possible through
device mobility (see Sec. II-D).
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL
EVALUATION
It is generally believed that physical layer security which
relies on unique device dependent features generated by hard-
ware imperfections of the RF chain and the antenna module
is hard to forge. However due to the availability of high end
software defined radios and waveform generators, physical
layer features are prone to attacks such as feature and signal
replay. Also, the novel beam pattern feature proposed in
section II-B introduces an additional attack vector unique to
mmWave wireless systems.
In this section, we study the security of our proposed beam
pattern based device identification method and PSD feature
based device identification against impersonation attacks.
Threat Model: The goal of MalloryM is to gain access
to the wireless network by impersonating the identity of a
legitimate user Bob in the network. Mallory may achieve this
goal in 2 stages: (1) eavesdropping, and (2) signal imperson-
ation.
Before proceeding to describe the attack stages, we make the
following assumptions about Mallory: (a) Mallory possesses
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Fig. 17. (a) X60 beam pattern 12 and (b) beam pattern feature of Bob at 3
APs (top row) and impersonated beam pattern feature at 3 APs (bottom row).
a millimeter wave RF transceiver (Sec III-A0b) and has the
knowledge of the communication channel (60.48 GHz in our
experiments) used by Alice and Bob. The active communi-
cation channel could also be deduced by RF sensing the
environment. (b) Mallory can use both directional antenna
and quasi-omni antenna for eavesdropping and impersonation
attacks. (c) We assume Mallory does not know the classifica-
tion/identification method used by the wireless network.
During the eavesdropping stage, Mallory records the beam
searching beacons of Bob whose identity she aims to fake
using quasi-omni antenna. Mallory could simply record the
beam searching beacons of Bob as long as she is in the
communication range of Bob.
Followed by the eavesdropping stage, Mallory initiates sig-
nal impersonation stage. Mallory replays the recorded beacons
from Bob either unchanged or after modifying the signal. Here
too Mallory can choose between a directional and quasi-omni
antenna pattern. During the impersonation stage, Mallory’s
objective is to replay the signal towards the access point Alice.
Here we make the assumption that Mallory knows the location
of Alice and hence can direct her transmit beam towards Alice
using directional beam pattern.
A. Impersonation of Antenna Pattern Feature
In this section, we describe the antenna pattern feature
impersonation attack.
a) Experimental Setting: We used the X60 node de-
scribed in Sec. III-A0b to capture the beacons from the legit-
imate device Bob. The receiver’s antenna is configured in the
quasi-omni mode for capturing the beacons. The fingerprinting
AP positions are as shown in Fig. 7a. The legitimate device
is placed at a position 3 meters from the AP 1. The attacker’s
receiver is placed directly behind the fingerprinting AP 1 to
capture the beacons. The captured baseband complex samples
are then transfered to the host computer and saved in a file. The
captured beacons are read from the file and transfered from
the host computer to the FPGA in the X60 used for replay.
The baseband I/Q samples are then upconverted to IF and then
to 60.48 GHz. The attackers transmitter is configured to use
directional antenna with beam pattern shown in Fig.17a. The
beacons are replayed from a position behind the legitimate
transmitter Bob.
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Fig. 18. Signal replay attack: (a) beam pattern feature and (b) PSD feature.
b) Attack on Classification and Identification System:
Here we look at the security implications of antenna pattern
feature signal replay attack on our proposed classification
and identification system. In particular we explore whether
the attacker was able to spoof the classifier in assigning the
beam pattern feature extracted from the replayed signals to
the targeted device class. For this experiment, the classifier
in Sec. II-F is trained with training data from all the 12
devices. We choose three of the 12 devices (Talon1, Acer1,
and Intel3) as the target devices and replay 250 sets of beam
searching beacons from each of the target device using the
attacker. We record the replayed beacon frames from the
attacker at the three AP positions. The replayed frames are
passed to the trained classifier and the identification accuracy
is evaluated. The attack is evaluated for both 1 AP and 3
APs case. Fig. 18a show the percentage of frames and their
associated target probabilites assigned by the classifier for
three target devices for both 1 AP and 3 APs case. For the
Talon1 and Acer1 attacks, we find that for single AP scenario,
the attacker was successfully able to spoof the classifier with
100% accuracy and more importantly the replayed frames
are classified with 99% probability as those belonging to the
targeted device. But for Intel3 device attack, 60% and 5% of
the replayed frames are assigned with probabilites 0.9 and 0.8
respectively as targeted device Intel3. The remaining 35% of
the replayed frames are misidentifed as some other device.
The overall attack success rate for Intel3 device is 65%. We
found that the beam pattern vector extracted from the replayed
frames deviates from the beam pattern of the legitimate device
at few positions in the extracted feature vector due to the
attacker transmitter not being able to accurately represent
those beacons. To improve the attack success rate in such
scenarios, we adopted an approach similar to the hill-climbing
attack [32] in biometric systems. In a hill-climbing attack, the
attacker repeatedly replays the signal each time with slight
modifications until the system accepts it as genuine. Similar
approach could be used to attack our beam pattern feature
by crafting the beacons to be replayed. Implementing such
an attack for our beam pattern replay is a daunting task as
the feature vector is high dimensional with length depending
on the number of codebooks used by the device. Therefore,
we designed a coordinated attack in which we placed another
attacker receiver behind the AP we want to impersonate. The
attacker receiver has a copy of the signal to be replayed. The
attacker receiver records the replayed signal from the attacker
transmitter and compares with the one transmitted. In that way
the attacker knows which beacon signal need to be crafted
to improve the attack success rate. Using the signal crafting
approach, the success rate for attack on Intel3 is 100%. As
mentioned in [11], the success of the attacker to impersonate
a target device in identification accuracy highly depends on
the number of devices used. For larger number of devices, the
classification boundary becomes obscure and the percentage
of attacker replayed signals successfully assigned to the target
device will decrease.
In practical scenarios, the attacker could only target 1 AP to
spoof at a time. Figure 18a show the percentage of frames and
their associated target probabilites assigned by the classifier
for three target devices for the 3 APs case. We see that for all
the three targeted devices, the replayed frames are assigned
probabilites < 1% as targeted device and the attacker was not
able to spoof the 3 APs fingerprinting system.
B. Impersonation of Spectral Feature
In this section, we discuss the impersonation of the spectral
feature for mmWave devices discussed in Section IV-1.
a) Experiment Setting: In our spectral feature imperson-
ation experiment, the attacker records the beacons and replays
them in a set up same as in Sec. V-A.
b) Attack on Classification and Identification System:
The identification system is trained with the classifier in
Sec. II-F and the training set consists of a spectral feature
fingerprint database from all the 12 devices. Four different
spectral feature identification systems are considered: spectral
feature with 128 FFT, 256 FFT, 1024 FFT, and 4096 FFT.
The spectral feature impersonation attack is performed for
each of the identification system. The impersonation attack
is targeted for three legitimate devices named Acer1, Talon1,
Talon2 from the enrolled devices. For each device, a total of
250 frames are replayed. The spectral feature for different FFT
length is extracted from the 250 frames and submitted to the
identification system. Figure 18b show the output probabilities
assigned to the replayed frames for 4096 FFT spectral feature
impersonation attack on Talon1, Talon2 and Acer1 devices.
Over 30% of the replayed frames are accepted as genuine
frames with high probability over 0.9. The overall imperson-
ation success rate for 4096 FFT spectral feature attack are
63%, 64% and 53% for Acer1, Talon1 and Talon2 respectively.
The impersonation success rate for impersonation attack on
128 FFT, 256 FFT and 1024 FFT spectral feature are 42%,
43.3%, and 50% respectively for Acer1 device. For Talon1,
they are 35%, 35.8%, and 53.3% for 128 FFT, 256 FFT, and
1024 FFT respectively. For Talon2, they are 30%, 31% and
41% for 128 FFT, 256 FFT and 1024 FFT respectively. We
noticed that as the FFT resolution goes down, the success rate
of attack also lowers. This trend is observed for all the devices
we impersonated. The reason for this is that, with lower FFT
resolution feature, the classification and identification accuracy
also reduces. This leads to reduction in attack success rate
as some of the replayed frames are incorrectly identified as
devices other than the one impersonated.
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C. Security Implications
Our findings suggest that similar to the PSD feature and
other conventional features [11], our proposed beam pattern
feature too is vulnerable to impersonation attacks. However,
by utilizing multiple views of the beam pattern to authenticate
a legitimate user, such attacks can be defeated. We see that the
beam pattern feature with multiple views has higher resilience
to impersonation attacks than the PSD feature. Robustness
of beam pattern feature to impersonation attacks has several
implications in mmWave wireless networks security. MmWave
devices could be authenticated using beam pattern physical
layer feature during the beam searching process. Thus, attacks
such as [5] could be prevented by accepting the sector sweep
feedback frame from the device only if it has been authenti-
cated during the beam searching phase.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a novel beam pattern feature for
fingerprinting mmWave devices. The proposed beam pattern
feature is contributed by the fabrication process of the antenna
array and the phase shifters used in the mmWave devices.
We showed that, the directionality of mmWave devices poses
additional significant challenges in the training as well as in the
identification process. Comprehensive training is necessary to
achieve an acceptable classification and identification accuracy
under mobility conditions. To that end, we proposed a multiple
APs fingerprinting architecture that exploits the rich spatial
features of the beam patterns used by the mmWave devices.
We also presented a conventional PSD feature for mmWave
devices and compared our proposed beam pattern feature with
it. We performed extensive experiments under various real-
world scenarios to confirm the effectiveness and reliability of
the proposed beam pattern feature.
We have also investigated the robustness of our proposed
beam pattern feature to impersonation attacks. We designed
and implemented our attacker on a 60 GHz mmWave testbed
and performed signal replay attack on the proposed beam
pattern and spectral features. We show that the impersonation
attack on the beam pattern feature for a single AP system
is almost always feasible with high success rate while for the
multiple APs system it is unsuccessful. For the spectral feature
impersonation attack, the degree of success varies highly from
40% to 60%. This suggests that the beam pattern feature is
robust and secure when compared to a conventional PSD based
scheme.
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